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Abstract—Due to the pervasiveness of high-speed networks and 
multimedia communications and storage, the demand for high-
speed cryptosystems is ever increasing. It is widely believed that 
there is a tradeoff between speed and security in cryptosystem 
design. No existing encryption algorithms are both fast enough 
for high-speed operation and sufficiently secure to withstand 
powerful cryptanalysis. In this paper, we propose and analyze a 
generic construction of high-speed encryption schemes. Our 
solution is based on the fact that there exist secure but relatively 
slow block ciphers, e. g. AES, and super-fast but relatively 
weaker stream ciphers. We then combine a secure block cipher 
with a super-fast stream cipher such that the resulting encryption 
scheme possesses both the speed of the stream cipher and the 
security of the block cipher. We show the results our security 
analysis as well as our experiment on a 2.1 GHz Pentium VI  
processor. 
Keywords- block ciphers; stream ciphers; high-speed encryption. 
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The High Speed Requirments 
Speed-hungry computer and communication applications 
are on the rise for a variety of services, such as multimedia 
electronic mail, video conferencing, and high-definition 
televisions. Several types of high-speed networks exist. One 
example of such networks is the Asynchronous Transfer Mode 
(ATM) technology which provides data rates from tens of 
Mb/s to Gb/s [1]. As new networks/multimedia services 
become more capable and user friendly, high-speed networks 
will continue to attract more traffic and more sensitive 
information (such as corporate propriety information). The 
content of such communication represents an increasingly 
lucrative target for eavesdropping and tampering. The need to 
protect multimedia data over high-speed network has been 
long recognized. For example, encryption of IP datagrams in 
the new Internet Protocol IPv6 is mandatory [2]. 
High-speed networks are expected to integrate a variety of 
multimedia applications with different traffic characteristics 
and quality of service (QoS) requirements [3]. Protection of 
the traffic, whether at the application level or at the network 
level, must not introduce degradation in QoS. This demands 
the availability of efficient encryption algorithms so that 
encryption speed does not become a performance bottleneck 
in bandwidth-hungry applications. 
B. Speed of Existing Ciphers 
Since we are concerned with traffic encryption, our focus 
in the present paper is on symmetric key ciphers. Such ciphers 
can be classified into block ciphers and stream ciphers.  
Intensive study on cryptanalysis to block ciphers has been 
carried out during the last decade and several very powerful 
methods, such as differential attack [4], truncated differential 
attack [5], linear attack [6] and algebraic attack [7], have been 
developed. A block cipher is regarded as secure if it is able to 
withstand all these known attacks. Examples of such block 
ciphers are DES, AES, IDEA, SAFER, TWOFISH and CAST. 
Typical speeds of these ciphers are around 20 to 50 MB/s on a 
Pentium IV 2.1GHz processor.  
Stream ciphers (see [8] and the references therein) are 
normally much faster than block ciphers. However, stream 
ciphers are perceived to be weaker in security than block 
ciphers. Many stream ciphers that used to be believed very 
secure were broken later. Even a carefully designed stream 
cipher might not withstand very careful and intensive attacks. 
An example is the stream cipher TWOPRIMES [9], which is 
proved to possess high linear complexity, large cycle length, 
good resistance to LSFR-synthesis attacks and many other 
desirable attributes of good stream ciphers; however, it was 
broken in with only a complexity of 232 [10].  
C. Existing Solutions to High Speed Encryption 
One way to meet the high-speed requirement is to design a 
fast cipher without revealing its algorithm and to implement it 
by hardware. This approach is normally not considered as 
prudent practice in the security community. One thing is that 
this puts a harsh limit on the use of the cipher – the 
implementation of the algorithm must be carefully guarded in 
trusted environment or tamper resistant hardware. Another and 
probably more serious problem is that once the algorithm is 
revealed, its weakness may be found under various powerful 
attacks. We have seen such examples as SkipJack and CMEA 
(cellular message encryption algorithm) [11]. The secret 
encryption algorithms were found to have various weaknesses 
a short time after they were released to the cryptographic 
community. 
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We also notice that some companies have designed very 
fast stream ciphers (e.g., [12], [13]); they publicly announce 
that their ciphers are secure because no one are able to break 
their ciphers and claim the big price awards they put up. In 
[13], ten million Japanese yen is put as the award to the people 
who can break their chaos-based cipher. But all these 
encryption schemes have not received sufficient and careful 
cryptanalyses. In crypto community, it is well-known that an 
unanswered challenge to break a cipher does not mean 
anything about the security of the underlying cipher. 
Therefore, these fast encryption schemes cannot give sufficient 
confidence to their users. 
In this paper we aim at designing super-fast and secure 
symmetric key encryption schemes. However, we do not 
propose new encryption algorithms. What we do is to combine 
existent strong algorithms (relatively slow) with fast 
algorithms to form new encryption schemes, which are fast 
enough to satisfy the high-speed requirement for various 
applications. Meanwhile, we can confirm the security of our 
schemes under certain reasonable assumptions. 
II. OUTLINE OF OUR SCHEMES
As we mentioned in the previous section, symmetric key 
ciphers can be roughly classified into stream ciphers and block 
ciphers. Block ciphers usually have stronger security than 
stream ciphers. Here we refer to the traditional stream cipher 
based on the LFSR. Block-cipher-derived stream ciphers, such 
as RC4, have similar security as the underlying block cipher. 
A block cipher is typically an iterated function on a fixed 
block size. The security mainly comes from the iteration. For a 
block cipher, it is impossible to express the output and the 
input in an explicit algebraic formula. This is because the 
iteration function makes the formula expand into an 
overwhelmingly large size. Block ciphers are usually designed 
to resist various kinds of attacks, including linear attack and 
differential attack and so on. Most of the attacks to block 
cipher are aimed at deriving the key. So a secure block cipher 
should be able to keep the key forever secret, even under  
attacks where attackers can arbitrarily choose plaintext/ 
ciphertext pairs as they want. Although it is controversial 
whether chosen plaintext or ciphertext attacks are practical, 
any news of possible breaking may decrease people's faith in a 
cipher. Hence, resistance to chosen plaintext/ciphertext attacks 
are regarded as a fundamental requirement of block ciphers.  
A stream cipher is usually a pseudo-random generator. The 
pseudo-random sequence (key stream) generated by the 
pseudo-random generator is XORed with the plaintext to 
obtain the ciphertext. The pseudo-random generator may or 
may not depend on the plaintext and ciphertext.  
Our generic construction of fast encryption schemes are 
based on the following observation: we combine a secure 
block cipher with a fast stream cipher such that the encryption 
scheme can have both the security of the block cipher and the 
speed of the stream cipher. The secret key of our encryption 
schemes is protected by the block cipher while the large 
plaintext is encrypted by the stream cipher with segment keys 
generated from the block cipher. The principle of this kind of 
combination has been adopted in the physical world for a long 
time in order to design strong but light-weight objects, for 
example wooden boats with steel framework. 
Let BE(K, m) denote a block cipher encryption algorithm 
(such as AES) on message m using key K and SE(k, M) denote 
a stream cipher encryption algorithm on message M using key 
k. Here m has fixed size, i.e., the block size of BE while M has 
arbitrary size. We divided a plaintext into segments with equal 
size (padding may be applied to the last segment): 
plaintext = 1pseg , 2pseg , 3pseg ,…, tpseg
The segment size is the number of bits of 1seg . Let K be 
the secret key of the scheme, which is a key of BE. The 
encryption is performed as follows. 
First we randomly choose a number r of the block size of 
BE, then generate the segment keys as k1 = BE(K, r), k2 = 
BE(K, k1), …, kt = BE(K, kt-1).  The corresponding ciphertext 
is given by 
r, 1cseg , 2cseg , 3cseg ,…, tcseg
where  
=icseg SE ),( ii psegk .
Note that r precedes the ciphertext so that decryption can be 
carried out at the receiver. We require that r never be reused. 
In our schemes, r is set to be 128-bit; therefore, the probability 
that two randomly selected r's happen to be the same is as 
small as correctly guessing the key K. (Note. The r can also be 
generated from the plaintext, say, let r = BE(the first 128 bits 
of the plaintext, K). There are actually many ways to generate 
r.).  
It is easy to see that such an encryption scheme can protect 
the secret key K if the block cipher BE can. That is, a secure 
block cipher can guarantee that our scheme's secret key will 
not be discovered by an attacker no matter what cryptanalysis 
means he exploits. The stream cipher SE we use here can be 
allowed to be weaker in the security. It is enough for our usage 
if SE can resist the attack of known plaintext/ciphertext pair of 
length over the segment size. The segment size can depend on 
how strong the SE is. The segment size can be taken larger if 
the SE has better security. The segment size also affects the 
speed of our scheme. The larger the segment size, the closer 
our speed is to SE's speed. The segment size in our schemes is 
usually taken from 152  to 182 . This is a very small number 
from the point of view of cryptanalysis. Therefore, the security 
principle of our schemes is based on the following 
observations: When we talk about a cipher, it may be strong 
under some attacks but weak under some more powerful 
attacks. The most powerful attacks are chosen 
plaintext/ciphertext attacks, which are towards deriving the 
secret key. However, the secret key of our scheme cannot be 
derived by chosen plaintext/ciphertext attacks due to using a 
secure SE. Chosen plaintext/ciphertext attacks make no sense 
in attacking segment keys since segment keys are never 
repeatedly used in our scheme.  
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III. FAST ENCRYPTION SCHEME VARIANT I
In this Section we deign a stream cipher that is about 
multiple times faster than a typical block cipher. When we take 
suitable segment size, the combined encryption scheme is 
almost as fast as the stream cipher. The experiment results will 
be shown in Section 6. 
The notations used here are the same as in Section 2. Let 
BE be the secure block cipher and SE be the fast stream 
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not in the original plaintext. It may be a random head 
appended to the original plaintext before the encryption. It may 
also be a number used as a counter to indicate the i-th 
encryption. It is fine as long as p1  satisfies a) p1  is different 
for different plaintext or b) p1  is not required to be 
































We have  
1. c p1 1=
2. c c cn2 3" =  SE(BE ( , ), )K p p p pn1 2 3"
3. c c cin in i n+ + + =1 2 1)" (
SE(BE( , ), )( )K p p p pin in in i n+ + +1 2 1"  for i = 1, 2, …, t.
The decryption is easy to see: just calculate BE( , )K p1  from 
c p1 1= , then decrypt c c cn2 3" to get p p pn2 3" . Then 
from pn  to get the next segment key and decrypt 
c c cn n n+ +1 2 2" , and so on. In this scheme, the segment size is 
128|n|. 
A. Description of SE 
Let the plaintext be  
b b bm1 2" "
where each bi is a 32-bit string. Let F be a function defined as  
F k x x k k k k( , ) (((( ) ) ) )= + ⊕ × ⊕ >>>1 2 3 4
where k is the 128-bit key and k k k k k= 1 2 3 4  for 32-bit ki , x
is a 32-bit string, ⊕ is the bit-wise exclusive-or, + and × are 
mod 232  addition and multiplication,  >>> is to reverse the 32 
bits into opposite ranking. The encryption of b b bm1 2" "  is 
d b F k F k F k d b di i i i i= ⊕ ⊕ ⊕− − −( , ( , ( , ) ) )1 1 2
where d d dm1 2" "  is the ciphertext. The d d d− − −1 2 3, ,
can be set k k k2 3 4, , .
B. Security Discusison of the Secheme 
Security of the key: The key of the encryption/decryption is 
K that is protected by the BE block cipher. On the assumption 
of the security of BE (or say on the assumption of the security 
of AES), K will never be derived by any attacker no matter 
what kind of attacks are used. 
Meet in the middle attack (the attack to the segment key): 
This is a kind of attack of brutal force. By meet one or more 
bits in the middle, exhaustively search the key bits relevant to 
these middle bits. Since we take 3 rounds of F, the meet in the 
middle attack does not work. This is because at least one way 
to the middle goes through two rounds of F, therefore, the 
number of key bits that affect a single bit is large: for two 
round of F, at least 96 bits of the key will effect a middle bit. 
This is enough to resist brute force searching. 
Chosen ciphertext attack (the attack to the segment key): 
We know that all the stream ciphers that have ciphertext 
feedback are weak to the chosen ciphertext. For example, if 
our stream cipher was defined by   
d b F k F k F k d d di i i i i= ⊕ ⊕ ⊕− − −( , ( , ( , ) ) )1 2 3
Then the cipher would be weak to chosen ciphertext attack. By 
choosing d di i− −=1 1' , d di i− −=2 2'  and d di i− −3 3, '
different at only one bit, the attacker can ask for the decryption 
of d di i, '  and apply the differential attack. But our stream 
cipher is defined by 
d b F k F k F k d b di i i i i= ⊕ ⊕ ⊕− − −( , ( , ( , ) ) )1 1 2
where the formula has both ciphertext and plaintext feedback. 
In such case, if the attacker choose both plaintext and 
ciphertext, the decrypted plaintext has very small chance to 
meet the plaintext chosen by the attacker.  If the attacker tries 
to pick such meeting formats from the known 
plaintext/ciphertext (instead of chosen ciphertext), the number 
of known plaintext/ciphertext (block) pairs required is 
estimated 248 (like the birthday attack to 23 32× ). But our 
segment can never be so large.  
IV. FAST ENCRYPTION SCHEME VARIANT II
The idea of combination of a fast cipher with a secure (but 
maybe slow) cipher can also be applied to two block ciphers. 
For example, Serpent has 32 round, which can resist the 
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cryptanalysis of over 2120  known plaintext-ciphertext pairs 
[14]. It is also estimated in [14] that a 6-round Serpent can 
resist cryptanalysis of over 225  blocks known plaintext-
ciphertext pairs(i.e., 322  bits). Now we can use the 32-round 
Serpent to get the segment keys and use each segment key to 
encrypt n blocks by the 6-round Serpent. Here we take n to be 
much smaller than 225 . In this case, the security of the 
scheme is guaranteed. The secret key is protected by the full 
round Serpent so that it can never be derived even in face of 
chosen plaintext/ciphertext attacks. The segment keys are also 
safe since each segment key is used to encrypt at most n
blocks, while attacking the segment key requires 225  blocks 
of known plaintext/ ciphertext pairs. 
 Of course, the key setup procedure may slow done the 
speed of the scheme. But if n is large enough, the speed of the 
scheme is about 32/6 times that of the original Serpent. In our 
implementation, we take n to be 28 , 29 , 210  and 211 . The 
speeds are listed in Section 6. 
V. FAST ENCRYPTION SCHEME VARIANT III
This fast encryption scheme consists of a very fast stream 
cipher and a block cipher as described in Section 2. The block 
cipher is used to generate segment keys and the stream cipher 
is used to generate key streams from segment keys.  The block 
cipher we used is AES. The design of the stream cipher is 
given below.   
 This stream cipher is used to extend a 128-bit key into a 
key stream of segment size. Before we illustrate the detailed 
design of the stream cipher, we give the notations below: 
&: bit-wise AND. ⊕: bit-wise XOR. >>> : right rotation. T :
a table containing 32 elements, each element is with 32 bits. 
F : Feedback function. G :  Output function. K :  The 128-
bit secret key. It consists of four 32-bit words: 
4321 and,, kkkk .
C: )310( ≤≤ iC i , each one is a 32-bit constant.  They are 
generated from the constant e  in the following way: 
0xFFFFFFFF&)2(31 to0for )1(32 +×== ii eCi
r : )630( ≤≤ iri , each one is between 3 and 14.   
They are generated from the constant π  in the following way: 
3;12mod0xFF)&)2((63 to0for )1(8 +×π== +iiri
The functions F  and G  are defined as follows: 
Definition of F:  The input of function F  is the table T  and 
two rotation constants 1r  and 2r .  The output of function F
is denoted as feedback . F  operates in the following way:  
+>>>⊕= )])22[]0[((((( 1rTTtem
]15[)])27[])10[ 2 TrTT +>>>⊕
]31&[temTtemfeedback ⊕=
Definition of G:  The input of function G  is the table T. The 
output of function of G  is denoted as output output.  And 
G  operates in the following way: 
+>>>⊕= )])23[]29[((( 1rTTtem
]2[)])13[])20[ 2 TrTT +>>>⊕
]31&[temTtemoutput ⊕=
The operation of this stream cipher consists of two stages: an 
initial setup stage and an output stage. 
Initial Setup  
1. Initialize the table T
4mod][31  to0for ii kCiTi +==
2. Run the main algorithm (given below in this section) for 
64 cycles and prepare for the output. 
3.
The Main  Algorithm 
For the thi  cycle, the cipher operates in the following way: 
1. Run the F  function with 32mod2ir  and 32mod12 +ir ,
obtain the value of feedback .
2.  feedbackTjTjTj =+== ]31[];1[][30  to0for
3.   Run the function G  and generate the output .    
The Security 
First, as we addressed previously, the secret K of the 
encryption scheme is protected by AES. Therefore, to attack 
the key is as hard as attack AES. Second, each segment key 
generated by AES is used to encrypt message of a very 
limited length by the stream cipher.  
To resist known plaintext/ciphertext attack: Since in this 
stream cipher the key stream is generated independent of 
input/output, the known plaintext/ciphertext attack is just like 
to know the key stream of the same length. In the stream 
cipher, both the linear operation and non-linear operation are 
well combined.  The relationships among the output words are 
extremely complicated. Although the G function is relative 
simple comparing to the traditional shift register-based 
ciphers, finding the relationship between the output blocks 
becomes more difficult due to the introduction of F. At this 
stage, we believe that the stream cipher cannot be broken 
within reasonable time for given key stream of short length, 
say 230  bits.  We think this is a conservative estimation. 
Anyhow, the security of this stream cipher is being 
investigated. 
VI. FAST ENCRYPTION SCHEME VARIANT III
We implemented the variants of our scheme described in this 
paper on a 2.1GHz Pentium-IV processor. AES is the block 
cipher we use for all these variants. The encryption speed of 
AES on our platform is about 50 MB/s. The average 
encryption speed for the variants of our scheme is given in the 
following tables based on 4 tests for each variant. 
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5,242 32,768 297 296 297 297 296 
5,242 65,536 304 302 304 304 303 
5,242 131,072 307 307 307 308 307 
5,242 262,144 309 309 309 309 309 






















1,048 32,768 116 116 116 116 116
1,048 65,536 118 119 118 118 118
1,048 131,072 119 120 119 119 120
1,048 262,144 120 120 120 120 120





















24,903 38,912 1338 1338 1342 1343 1340
24,903 79,824 1465 1470 1470 1465 1467
24,903 159,648 1543 1537 1543 1543 1542
24,903 319,296 1577 1584 1577 1584 1580
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we proposed a general principle to combine a 
strong but slow cipher with a weak but fast cipher such that 
the combined encryption scheme is as strong as the former 
and as fast as the latter. We also gave some concrete variant 
schemes under this principle.  
Our design is based on the observation on the available 
attacks to symmetric key ciphers. When we talk about a 
cipher, it may be weak under some powerful attacks, i.e., the 
chosen plaintext/ciphertext attacks, which are targeting to 
drive the secret key. Such attacks make no sense towards 
deriving segment keys. Therefore, many "weak" ciphers 
become "strong" when being used under our principle. 
Although our schemes are very fast, we would like to 
point out that the encryption schemes constructed under our 
principle have speed advantage only when they are used to 
encrypt large amount of data.  
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